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Introduction
The idea that science is value
free

The idea that the sciences are value free has long played a key role in the
self-understanding and the public image of modern science. Poincare,
writing early in this century, captured its core as follows:
Ethics and science have their own domains, which touch but do not
interpenetrate. The one shows us to what goal we should aspire, the
other, given the goal, teaches us how to attain it. So they never conflict
since they never meet. There can be no more immoral science than
there can be scientific morals.
(Poincare 1920/ 1958: 12)
Science and values only touch; they do not interpenetrate. To deny this is
often perceived as to challenge that science is the pre-eminent or
exemplary rational endeavor, to demean the cognitive credentials of
science and to undercut its claim to produce knowledge. Lately, however, it
has been much contested from an eclectic variety of viewpoints: feminism,
social constructivism, pragmatism, deep ecology, fundamentalist religions,
and a number of third world and indigenous people's outlooks. Exactly
what is at issue does not always emerge clearly in these contestations. The
rhetoric tends to be at high volume, but the argument thin. Incommensur
ability seems to reign . From one viewpoint, the mounting threat of
multiple irrationalities and empty voluntarism looms large; from the other,
the entrenchment of ideologies.
I will attempt to sort out what is at stake in the contestation of "science
is value free," an idea that incorporates several distinct views about ways in
which science and values do (ought) not interpenetrate. But those who
affirm it have always recognized Poincare's distinction, and held that
science and values touch in various ways with more or less significant
effects. Too often the critics point only to aspects of the touch, but even
when the focus is on alleged interpenetrations a further ambiguity arises.
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For "science is value free" in general hardly represents a fact. Perhaps it
represents an idealization of fact. 1 It also represents a value, a goal or
aspiration of scientific practices and a criterion for appraising its products
and their consequences. The fact and value components cannot be
separated. To the extent that "science is value free" represents a fact, or an
idealization of a fact, that is because "science is value free" has been held
as a value; and its being held as a value is without foundation if it is not
possible for it to be increasingly manifest in fact. Thus to refute "science is
value free" it is not enough to display cases where it is not manifested in
fact; rather, the cognitive resources of the practices of science must be
assessed for their ability and likelihood to bring about its manifestations
increasingly and systematically.
In this introductory chapter I will provide an overview of the various
sources of the idea that science is value free, leading to the proposal that it
should be regarded as constituted by three component views: impartiality,
neutrality and autonomy. Then I will outline some of the important ways in
which science and values may interact without (from the proponents'
viewpoint) the idea being challenged. Finally I will preview the focus,
argument and methodology of the book.

SOURCES
"Science is value free" has several sources. Its kernel is present already in
the works of Galileo and Bacon. Galileo (1623/1957: 270) refers to "the
facts of Nature, which remains deaf and inexorable to our wishes"; and
Bacon affirms, warning us to be alert to the "Idols of the mind," the
sources of error to which we are prone: "The human understanding is no
dry light, but receives an infusion from the will and affections; whence
proceed sciences which may be called 'sciences as one would'" (Bacon
1620/ 1960: Aphorism 49).
Metaphysical/ Galilean

The Galilean input to the idea of science as value free is metaphysical. It
leads to: " . . . the discarding by scientific thought of all considerations
based upon value-concepts, such as perfection, harmony, meaning and
aim, and finally the utter devalorization of being, the divorce of the world
of value from the world of facts" (Koyre 1957: 4).
Let me summarize it in contemporary dress. The world, "the facts of
nature," the spatio-temporal totality, is fully characterizable and explicable
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in terms of "its underlying order" - its underlying structures, processes and
laws. All objects belonging to the underlying order can be fully character
ized in quantitative terms; all interactions are lawful; and the laws (not
necessarily deterministic) are expressible in mathematical equations. Such
objects are not construed as objects of value. Oya objects of the underlying
order, they are part of no meaningful order, they have no natural ends, no
developmental potentials, and no essential relatedness to human life and
practices. Values - and objects, qua objects of value - are not represented
as emergent from the underlying order of the world.
An object may come to acquire value through its relationship to human
experience, practice, or social organization, but any role it plays there is
played in virtue of its causal powers, of what it is qua part of the
underlying order of the world, so that for explanatory purposes that it may
have acquired value is irrelevant. Since human beings are part of the
world, some of the historically contingent states of affairs in the world will
be a consequence of human causal agency. But, the view maintains, the
structures, processes and laws that make up the underlying order of the
world are ontologically independent of human inquiry, perception and
action; they do not vary with the theoretical commitments, outlooks,
interests or values of investigators. On this view, it is a "fact" that value
derives from an object's relationship to human experience, practice or
social organization (that human agents generate value), and so this "fact" is
explicable, in principle, in terms of underlying structure, process and law.
But it does not follow from a theory that explains this "fact" that human
agents themselves are objects of value.
The underlying order of the world, and its constituent entities, are
simply there to be discovered - the world of pure "fact" stripped of any
link with value (MacIntyre 1981: 80-1 ). The aim of science is to represent
this world of pure "fact," the underlying order of the world, independently
of any relationship it might bear contingently to human practices and
experiences. Such representations are posited in theories which, in order to
be faithful to the object of inquiry, must deploy only categories devoid of
evaluative content or implications. Thus, they must not use categories that
can be applied to things only in virtue of their being related to human
experiences or practices. Concretely, simplifying a little, this means using in
theories only quantitative concepts, or more generally, materialist concepts
(those that designate properties of material objects qua material objects, not
qua related to human experience) and, in any case, no teleological,
intentional or sensory concepts.
Thus we arrive at one dimension of the idea of the "neutrality" of
science: scientific theories have no value judgments among their logical
implications. They cannot, it is said, for they contain no value categories. A
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second dimension is often taken to follow: that accepting a theory has no
cognitive consequences at all concerning the values one holds. A third
dimension is suggested too: that scientific theories are available to be
applied so as to further projects linked with any values. After all, they
represent "fact" about the world, which can - so far as science is
concerned - be related to, or come to serve the interests of any values
whatever. If in fact they do not serve to inform the projects motivated by
particular values, that is an entirely contingent matter. Notice that this last
claim rests uneasily with another that has been heralded in the modern
scientific tradition, that science serves especially well the projects of
material progress; and it clashes strongly with those world-views (that
"progress" intends to supplant) that consider the world to be infused with
meaning or value.
Epistemological and methodological/Baconian

In contrast to the Galilean, the Baconian source is epistemological and
methodological. Again I summarize a contemporary version. It is through
experience that we gain access to the world, which can be considered a
complex repository of possibilities, of which the ones that are realized may
be (increasingly) connected with our practices and our planned interven
tions. But the world is not generally what we would have it be. Not
everything that we desire or imagine to be possible is among the world's
repository of possibilities. Considerations derived from values cannot
determine what is possible. We find out what is possible only in the course
of engagement with the world, through successful practices, including most
importantly experimental ones. A scientific theory aims to encapsulate
whatever it can of this repository of possibilities of the domains of
phenomena within its compass; hence, the centrality in methodology of
experiment.
Sound scientific knowledge, that which we can count on for practical
adoption, is rooted in replicability and agreement. Only what is observed,
especially in experimental settings, and certified by replication and
agreement - independently of our desires, value perspectives, cultural and
institutional norms and presuppositions, expedient alliances and their
interests - can properly serve as evidence for scientific posits and for
choosing among scientific theories. As Hempel puts it: "The grounds on
which scientific hypotheses are accepted or rejected are provided by
empirical evidence, which may include observational findings as well as
previously established laws and theories, but surety no value judgments"
(Hempel l 965: 9 l ). This is one of the sources of the idea of the
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"impartiality" of science, an idea concerning the proper grounds for
accepting scientific posits or making scientific judgments.
The Baconian source of impartialiry is often complemented by a view
about the nature of scientific inference, or about how empirical data are
related to theories so that they can serve as evidence for accepting
theoretical posits, or choosing which theories to accept. The view is that
scientific inference can be reconstructed in terms of accordance with
certain formal rules (Chapter 3). The rules mediate. between empirical data
and theories in such a way that following them leads to unambiguous
choices about which theories to accept, reject or deem as requiring further
investigation, or at least to unambiguous assignments of degrees of
confirmation to theoretical hypotheses. They provide, as it were, the means
to transfer intersubjective acceptance from the available data to the theory.
While there has been at times widespread agreement that scientific
inference, and any rational inference, can be explicated in terms of formal
rules, there has never been anything approaching unanimity about what
the rules are, or even about whether they are deductive, abductive,
statistical, inductive, or some combination of these. - Bacon himself is
usually interpreted as holding that they are inductive.
The general view (though not any particular account of what the rules
are) became reinforced with the logical empiricists' and critical rationalists'
distinction between the contexts of discovery and justification, and thence
with holding the rule-governed account of scientific inference to apply
only in the context of justification. Oversimplifying: a theory is properly
accepted (or justified) if and only if it is related to the data in accordance
with the rules. Values (and, for example, metaphysics) may play a role in
the process of discovery in the course of generating and exploring the
merits of the theory, but they can have nothing to do with assessments of
its proper acceptance. As Carnap ( 1928/ 196 7: xvii) put it, after conceding
a role to "emotions, drives, dispositions and general living conditions" in
the process of discovery: " . . . for the justification of a thesis the physicist
does not cite irratwnalfactors [my emphasis], but gives a purely empirical
rational justification."
The success of modern science

Both neutrality and impartiality concern the content of what is posited in
scientific theories: neutrality, its implications and consequences; impartiality,
the grounds for accepting it. One derives from "objectivity," representing
faithfully the object of inquiry; the other from "intersubjectivity" as a
condition on empirical inquiry. In practice, the two ideas tend to fuse. 2 In
order that there be any scientific knowledge, the Galilean idea needs to be
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complemented with a methodology (or procedures that can give it
empirical content); and, methodologically, since objectivity cannot be had
directly, intersubjectivity seems to be the best available substitute.
Conversely, Baconian methodology is deployed characteristically in testing
theories that meet requirements derived from the Galilean idea, although
the Baconian idea itself encompasses any inquiry that is systematic and
empirical (Chapters 5 and 8).
The fusion of the Galilean and Baconian ideas underlies the manifest
success of modern science. Bacon promised that utility would follow from
deploying his methodology. That is not what I have directly in mind.
Rather it is the manifest success of modern science in increasing "the stock
of knowledge." One may identify this success primarily in terms of the
discovery of objects (for example atoms, electromagnetic radiation, viruses,
genes) or of the definitive entrenchment of some relatively circumscribed
theories (for example the heliocentric theory of planetary motion, theories
of molecular chemistry, theories of the bacterial and viral causation of
diseases, theories that explain the workings of instruments). Such
knowledge, of course, has been widely applied in practice: in technology, in
medicine, in interpreting various phenomena of the world of daily
experience; and, successful application is powerful confirming evidence in
support of the knowledge. Items in the stock of knowledge have been
accepted in accordance with impartiality and so their cognitive claims are
compelling regardless of what values one holds. The sustained success of
modern science, as it were, speaks unambigu ously to the strength (but not
to the certainty or unrevisability) of its cognitive claims.
A claim that is accepted in accordance with impartiality is binding
regardless of the values that are held - so that the presuppositions of all
practices, and the beliefs that inform all actions, should (rationally) all be
made consistent with it. 3 This "binding equally" should not be confused
with what I have earlier called "neutrality" with its three dimensions:
"consistent with all value judgments," "no (cognitive) consequences in the
realm of values," "evenhandedly applicable regardless of values held"; nor
with the stronger view (Chapter 3) that all practices and actions, regardless
of the values they are intended to further, should be informed by scientific
knowledge to the extent possible. Neutrality presupposes impartiality; and,
when the Galilean and Baconian ideas are fused - especially if the
metaethical and logical views described in the next two subsections are
endorsed - it may appear that impartiality implies neutrality. But, I will argu e
(Chapter 4) "binding equally" is not consistent with endorsing all three
strands of the idea of neutrality; and subsequent attempts to revise neutrality
into a coherent thesis confront numerous difficulties.
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Metaethical

Components of both neutrali!J and impartiali!J have been held to gain
further credibility from a widespread metaethical view: that values
represent subjective phenomena, preferences or utilities so that "value
judgments" are considered to be only articulations of personal preferences
not open to rational appraisal. As such, value judgments lack truth value:
" ... they do not express assertions" (Hempel l 965: 86). A person's making
them is open to scientific investigation and explanation, but not fundamen
tally to critical evaluation. On this view, they cannot be among a theory's
logical implications, not just on the ground that theories lack value
categories, but because 0acking truth value) no proposition at all can have
them among its entailments. Similarly, a value judgment, in principle,
cannot cognitively affect either empirical data or scientific inferences.
Logical

Closely connected with the metaethical source is a logical view: statements
of fact do not entail statements of value (Hume l 739/1968); and
statements of value do not entail statements of fact (Bacon's Aphorism 49,
quoted on p. 2). The metaethical view is often thought to explain the
logical; but the latter may be entertained in combination with other views
about the nature of values. The Galilean idea may be seen as a particular
instance of the general Humean schema: "Fact does not imply value," but
the argument sketched for it there does not depend on affirming the
general schema. The metaphysical source is independent of the logical
source, and arguments (Bhaskar 1979; Margolis 1995; Murdoch 1992;
Midgley 1979; Putnam 1978, 1981, 1987, 1990; Scriven 1974) against the
logical view may leave the metaphysical idea untouched. On the other
hand, the Baconian schema: "Value does not imply fact," seems to me to
be correct and not dependent on accepting the above metaethical view. It
is, however, consistent with values having implications about the interest or
relevance of facts, and the adopting of values having factual presupposi
tions.
Both the Humean and Baconian schemata, however, draw attention
away from some other logical relations involving fact and value. From fact
(especially as it is represented in scientific theory) one can infer certain
matters about what is possible and impossible. And judgments of value
(Chapter 2) have presuppositions about what is possible and impossible.
Here, at least, is an avenue through which fact and value may logically
interact with important implications for working out the idea of neutrality
in detail.
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Practical and institutional

The fundamental sources of the idea of science as value free are those
from metaphysics (ontological primacy of underlying structure, process
and law), epistemology (intersubjectivity of data, rule-bound scientific
inference) and methodology (centrality of experiment), and success in
producing knowledge. The currency of the metaethical and logical views
has provided reinforcement, rhetorically of service, but inessential. So far I
have considered the idea as being about the content and consequences of
scientific theoretical products, and about the character of scientific
assessment and knowledge claims.
But science should not be identified with its theories. We do not grasp
enough of the character of scientific theories if we abstract them from the
processes in which they are generated, tested, assessed, reproduced,
transformed, interlinked with other theories, adopted in practice,
transmitted and surpassed. Scientific theories are both products of and of
instrumental importance to scimtific practices, and our cognitive attitudes
toward theories are shaped within these practices. Members of the scientific
community engage in these practices, which are made intelligible in the light
of a long tradition; and they are conducted within various kinds of scimtific
institutions. These institutions, in turn, depend on other institutions in
society at large for the provision of their necessary material and social
conditions.
We can look at scientific theories from various points of view: the
appropriate cognitive attitudes to hold toward them in virtue of their
relations with empirical data; as products of a practice; as produced by
practitioners who have certain characteristics (including qualifications and
perhaps moral qualities); and as produced within certain types of
institutions which express particular values, perhaps linked with those of
the institutions that provide the material and social conditions needed for
research or whose interests are best served by practical applications of
scientific results. Since scientific practice must be conducted within
institutions, the possibility of there being constraints on its conduct and
outcomes, derived from the institution's interests and values, cannot be
summarily excluded. The potential for tension with "science is value free"
is obvious; not an idle potential, for sometimes it turns into outright
conflict. I indicated an avenue on p. 7 whereby fact and value may interact
through the intermediary of what is possible and impossible. A possibility
presupposed by a valuative outlook (endorsed widely in society, in
institutions that materially support science or by a significant political
movement) may be confirmed to be impossible in a scientific theory. Then,
in the name of the values, there can be a strong motive to overrule the
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scientific claim. Or, more subtly, where such a conflict is incipient, the
scientific community (consciously or not) may simply withhold from
investigating the inconvenient possibility. My point is that it is quite
intelligible that values intrude on the scientific claims that are held whether or not this intrusion is considered rationally admissible.
The idea that science is value free regards all such intrusion as distor
tion, and thus to be kept out of scientific practices:
One of the strongest, if still unwritten, rules of scientific life is the
prohibition of appeals to heads of state or to the populace at large in
scientific matters. Recognition of a uniquely competent professional
group and acceptance of its role as the exclusive arbiter of profes
sional achievement has further implications. The group's members, as
individuals and by virtue of their shared training and experience, must
be seen as the sole possessors of the rules of the game or of some
equivalent basis for unequivocal judgments.
(Kuhn 1970: 168)
Because there is an intelligible mechanism through which such intrusion
can readily occur, counter-mechanisms need to be operative within
scientific practice. Thus arises the further idea of the "autonomy" of the
practices and institutions in which scientific theories are generated,
entertained, tested and evaluated. In practice, according to this idea,
autonomy is a condition for gaining impartiality of theoretical appraisal and
neutrality of theoretical claims.
Autonomy tends to be a rather slippery idea - reflecting diverse and even
contradictory currents - and one that is often and easily trivialized. At one
level it is a political proposal: leave science to the scientists, but also provide
them with the resources to conduct their inquiries with no strings attached.
Appeals to neutrality, and to success in gaining knowledge and informing
practical applications, are often made to support this proposal. It also
presumes that the growth of scientific knowledge (and of the body of
accepted theories that manifest impartw.lity and neutrality) will take place
most effectively within practices that involve and are under the control of
practitioners of the scientific community. A certain reading of the history of
science might support this presumption. Autonomy also draws on the idea
that science has its own internal dynamic, that science defines its own
problems, asks its own questions, identifies its own research priorities,
seeking to gain ever more accurate, more unified, more encompassing
representations of the underlying order. The internal dynamic, it is said,
responds only to the evidence and to the appropriate criteria of cognitive
value. According to this view, in the long run the history of science is the
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unfolding of this internal dynamic, punctuated by moments of intrusion
from outside values and interests which always retard the process.
The proposal for autonomy normally grants sole authority to the scientific
community with regard not only to defining problems and appraising
theories, but also to determining the qualifications required for member
ship in the scientific community, and deciding the content of science
education. This draws on the sociological posits that members of the
scientific community conduct their scientific practice motivated by the
objectives of impartiality and neutrality or, more likely, that their activities are
so structured that in the long run accord with impartiality and neutrality is
virtually assured; and that scientific education adequately attunes them to
accept as knowledge only that which accords with impartiality.
These posits are bolstered by the claim, common in the public image
presented by the tradition of modern science, that the scientific community
has successfully cultivated among its members in their conduct as scientists
the "scientific ethos" (Merton 195 7)4, the practice of such virtues as
honesty, disinterestedness, forthrightness in recognizing the contributions
(and opening one's own contribution publicly to the rigorous scrutiny) of
others, humility and courage to follow the evidence where it leads. Clearly
this is the stuff of which myths are made.
Autonorrry is not easy to render in a precise thesis, and its historical and
sociological presuppositions are open to further empirical investigation. It
is better regarded, I think, as a reaction affirming a value in the face of
unhappiness occasioned by its perceived rejection or subordination - a
reaction that provides \1 ready and unthreatening explanation of why
sometimes science has gone astray. The meaning of autonomy is shaped in
opposition to troubling events, symbolized by the trial of Galileo, the
horrors of Lysenkoism, the bemusing stubbornness of the creationists and,
among some, also by the ready willingness of scientists to engage in
classified research when called to do so for the sake of national security
and to keep their results secret or legally limited in their use for the sake of
corporate profits.
While the idea of autonomy arises as a reaction to certain kinds of
"outside interferences," hinted at in symbols rather than specified sharply,
there is one kind of "outside influence" that generally is tolerated, even
overtly welcomed - when the institutions which fund and support science
are granted an important role in determining research agendas, the
problems to be investigated and the domains of phenomena to be studied.
Where this happens (and it happens commonly enough) research priorities
a,re generally not set according to the posited internal dynamic of science,
but by negotiation with the bearers of non-scientific values and interests typically for a practical reason. This need not undermine impartiality,
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though it may (Lewontin 1993), for the role of the values and interests may
be restricted to the choice of research domain and need not extend to
having impact on which specific theory comes to be accepted of that
domain. We will see much later on p. 251 (Chapter 10) what impact it may
have on neutrality. Impartiality, however, might be threatened if there was in
fact an identity of (personal and social) interest among the scientific
community and the agencies of support. The myth of the scientific ethos
functions to deny that there are such identities of interest. Others counter
that a greater diversity (of personal and social values and interests) among
the practitioners of science would make a more convincing argument; but
public pressure to bring about such greater diversity tends to be opposed in
the name of autonomy.
It is a compromise of the idea of autonomy of scientific practice to
grant a role to non-scientific values and interests in choosing a domain of
investigation. I do not criticize such compromises per se, for scientific
practice may be impossible without some of them (and less than complete
manifestation of a value does not mean that it is not a seriously adopted
value). However, in particular cases, I do criticize the choice from the
perspective of other values. In its most compelling form, autonomy is
claimed so that the responsibility of scientists - concerning impartiality ·and
neutrality - can be exercised. In a trivial form, which has become more
common in recent years, it amounts to little more than the special plea to
be free to enter into compromises with whatever agencies one sees fit,
without regard to the broader social interests that may be affected by the
choices.
Scientific method

The ideas about empirical data and scientific inference, often functioning
in concert with the Galilean idea, may be put together under the idea that
modern science has a method. The accepted theories of modern science are
the product of following a method in which intersubjectivity and often
constraints grounded in the Galilean metaphysical idea are the defining
elements. The method matters; not who is following the method. I
mentioned on p. IO the related idea that the practitioners of science,
insofar as they engage in scientific practice, are the bearers of the virtues of
the scientific ethos. Qya bearers of these virtues they are interchangeable,
reinforcing that who is following the method does not matter, subject to the
condition that the practitioner has the relevant competencies (observational,
experimental, mathematical, inferential, conceptual, theoretical) necessary
to follow the method. "Method," as used here, pertains principally to how
theories come to be properly accepted or appraised, not (except as a
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constraint) to how they come to be put forward and entertained in the first
place; it is held to pertain to the context of justification, not that of
discovery.
According to common views, the other side of method is .free creativiry,
for that is what supposedly enables a theory to be put forward for
consideration. (A theory is created; then it is appraised following the norms
of the method.) In the "context of discovery," individuality is celebrated
and no potential (conscious or unconscious) stimulus to creativity (which
flourishes on analogies) including values, is ruled out a priori. Perhaps
values can slip in here and play unnoticed roles. Theory appraisal is
comparative: it involves choice among competing theories, but the
competitors have first to be "created." Values may be hidden because a
competing theory that would enable the values to become manifest may
not have been "created." lntersubjective agreement, obtained through
following the method, may not be enough to overcome this, especially if
the agreement is among practitioners selected in a context where
competence is the only explicitly recognized necessary requirement, and
the assumption prevails that they embody the scientific ethos. For they, the
"creative innovator," the research institution and its funders may share
identical interests that, in the absence of tension derived from competing
interests, may simply fall into the unproblematic and unrecognized
background. Thus, it is possible that values are in play and not "noticed"
because the intersubjective agreement extends to include agreements about
them. Here is a hint that who the practitioners are may matter.
Perhaps impartialiry can be regularly achieved only if there is a diversity
(with respect to values and interests) of practitioners in critical interaction
and some diffusion of cognitive authority. "Method" may require clashing
value perspectives rather than the activities of practitioners who act
individually out of the scientific ethos. 5 Scientific appraisal may be
communal or social: the product of interaction rather than the sum of
individual acts of following the method (Longino 1990; Solomon 1992;
1994).
PERMISSIBLE INTERACTIONS BETWEEN
SCIENCE AND VALUES

The ideas of impartiality, neutrality and autonomy s�m up what I think is
the core of the idea that science is value free. Endorsing them is compati
ble with values playing many roles in connection with science, most
importantly: values may play decisive roles in connection with the stances
adopted toward theories prior to their acceptance; cognitive values help to
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articulate the idea of impartiality; and the three ideas themselves function
as values that may not always be well reflected in actual scientific practice.
Theories: acceptance, application, significance

Earlier, I have used expressions like "accepting" and "choosing" a theory.
T he idea that science is value free concerns characteristics of the theories
that we accept and ought to accept, their consequences and the practices
in which they are considered and come to be accepted. I will now
introduce in some detail the key notion of "accepting a theory" (which is
deployed frequently throughout the text) and distinguish it from several
other stances that may be taken toward theories. Values may play a variety
of roles in connection with the other stances.
Accepting theories

I will stipulate a usage6 of "to accept a theory," and distinguish it from
some other important stances that may be- taken toward theories
(hypotheses, proposals, posits, or conjectures): provisionally entertaining
them, adhering to them in research practices, endorsing their greater
evidential support (compared to rival theories) and applying them in
practical life. A theory (T ) is accepted of a domain (D) or domains of
phenomena; one "accepts T of D."
To accept T ef D is to judge that, in the light of the available evidence, T
of D is sufficiently well supported that it need not be submitted to further
investigation - where, for example, it is judged that further investigation
can be expected only to replicate what has already been replicated many
times over and to bring minor refinements of accuracy and sharper
identification of the bounds of D. It is to consider it among the items.of
rationally consolidated beliefs (Chapter 3) or to include it in the stock of
knowledge so that ceteris paribus it is sufficiently well established to be
applied to inform practical projects (pertaining to the phenomena of D).
Acceptance is a strong stance to take toward a theory. It also always
remains, in principle, open to revision that might be occasioned by new
developments concerning either empirical data or theory. To rdect T ef D is
to accept T' of D, where T and T' are held to be inconsistent.
Accepting T (of D) is a stronger stance than endorsing that, on balance tlze
availab/,e evidence points more toward T than toward rival theories that have been
entertained, for then one anticipates that the balance may well be
disrupted by further research including that which may provisionally
entertain novel rival theories. Acceptance is a stance adopted when
relevant research has become considered as effectively completed, like
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(ideally) in the cases mentioned (in the preceding section) as successes of
modern science. In these cases it seems reasonable to maintain, and the
consensus of the scientific community confirms, that further research will not could! - not lead to a change of judgment about T, except at the levels
of refinement and meeting standards of accuracy. It involves (ideally)
judging that the degree of evidential support is sufficiently high according
to the highest available standards for estimating it, so that consistency with
an approximation of T (of D) becomes a constraint upon any theory that
has more encompassing scope than T (Joseph 1980). Accepting T (of D) is
accompanied by a sort of (pragmatic) certitude, but that should not be
confused with (epistemic) certainty.
Accepting a theory comes at the end of a process of research in which it
has been developed from predecessors, which have been provisionally
entertained and adhered to by committed investigators, and separated out
from both their predecessors and other rival theories by way of numerous
judgments of comparative evidential support or rational acceptability acceptance of a theory follows (properly) after having made numerous
theory choices. A theory (an early version of one that may eventually be
accepted) may be provisionally entertained for the sake of exploring its
implications, its potential to generate and solve problems, and its
relationship with empirical data and with other theories. Generally this
involves endorsing the plausibility of T: To hold that T provides conceptual
and hyp othetical resources sufficient to shape (reshape, contribute toward)
a research agenda, and that the agenda is sufficiently promising to warrant
material, financial and institutional support. In order to be developed and
reshaped into an acceptable form a theory must also be adhered to, that is, a
research agenda framed by it must be participated in and commitment
must be made to its furtherance.
Applying theories

Finally, accepting T (of D) is not the same thing as applying it.
"Application" concerns the role of T in the realm of daily life and
practical activity. T may not be applicable because D does not include
sign ificant phenomena of daily life and experience (Chapter 7) or because
it cannot be deployed significantly in practices which express one's adopted
value complex. To apply T, I stipulate, is to apply T to significant phenom
ena of daily life and experience and/ or to apply it in practical activity. T is
applied to phenomena when it is used (by way of providing representations
of them with its categories and principles) to provide understanding of
them - so that when the relevant phenomena of daily life are included in
D, acceptance of T (of D) suffices to ensure its applicability to them. T is
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applied in practical act1V1ty when it is used to inform practical (often
.technological) activities related to the phenomena to which it applies
concerning such matters as the workings of things, means to ends, the
attainability of ends and the consequences of realizing the possible.
My usage of "apply" is more general than the one commonly associ
ated with the phrase "applied science", which limits "apply" to the second
component, that is, essentially to t,echno/,ogi,cal applications, when scientific
knowledge is deployed as an instrument that informs effectively practical
innovations in daily life, and particularly the development, introduction,
operation and maintenance of technological devices and practices, where
the outcomes of scientific inquiry become causal factors in transforming
the social "world." On this common usage, the making and exploding of
an atomic bomb is referred to as an application of physical theory, but
explaining how the sun is a source of light and heat in terms of its
thermonuclear activity is not. As a widespread and socially significant
phenomenon technological application is relatively recent, dating from
only about 150 years ago (White 1968), though applications of theories to
explain the workings of technological objects, and theoretical reflection on
technological objects as a source of scientific ideas, date at least from the
time of Galileo, as do theoretical applications to numerous other
phenomena of daily life and experience.
Significance of a theory

Clearly (moral and social) values must play a role when a theory is applied.
No matter how strongly a theory is taken to be accepted it is applied only if
applying it accords with one's values. One may apply a theory to significant
phenomena of daily life, but not in one's central practical activities. In the
case of technological applications, a condition of 0egitimately) applying T
is the moral propriety of the intended consequences and the anticipated
side effects. The highest degree of cognitive value is never sufficient to
legitimate practical application, so that any move from acceptance to
application in practical activity should always explicitly involve considera
tions of moral and social values. Accepting a theory does not imply the
desirability or legitimacy of applying it practically, but only that there is no
cognitive barrier to doing so. The legitimate applicability of a theory in
practical activity requires support from one's adopted value complex.
I will say that T (of D) is significantfor specified values if T is applicable to
important phenomena of daily life and experience and/ or is applicable in
practical activities in ways that further (and do not undermine) the interests
shaped from adherence to the values. A theory is more or less significant
for given values; and it may be highly significant, for example, concerning
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applications to phenomena but not concerning applications in practical
activities. Significance is a matter of degree, multifaceted and subject to
historical variation, and it does not follow from acceptance (c( Anderson
1995b).
The role of cognitive values

The idea of impartiality denies that value judgments are among the
grounds for accepting and rejecting theories. But to accept or reject a
theory is itself to make a judgment of cognitive value (worth, merit) (Scriven
1991). One interpretation of impartialiry is that judgments of "non
cognitive" (personal, moral, social, aesthetic, etc.) value play no role in
choosing theories. Another, drawing heavily from the metaethical and
logical sources, wants to keep out all value judgments. It proposes to do so
effectively by reducing theory appraisal to the recognition of the outcomes
of rule-governed operations involving formal relations between theories
and empirical data. I favor the first interpretation (Chapter 3), and I will
develop it in detail (Chapters 4 and 10). Regardless of interpretation,
however, to choose a theory is to grant it cognitive value, to affirm (at least)
that it is a better theory than some other competitor. Such affirmations are
intended to be "objective"; there is a fact of the matter about which theory
has greater cognitive value, causing if not outright paradox at least
perplexing tension with both the metaethical and logical views that
partially ground the second interpretation (Scriven 197 4, 1991; Putnam
1981).
It fits with the interpretation of impartialiry that I favor that judgments of
cognitive value can be construed as the outcomes of estimates of how well
theories fare when appraised in the light of certain criteria (for example,
empirical adequacy, explanatory and predictive power), that is, estimates of
how well theories manifest certain cognitive values (Chapter 3). "Science is
value free," thus, should be considered compatible with the view that
cognitive value judgments play essential roles in the accepting and rejecting
of theories; it thus presupposes that cognitive values can be clearly
distinguished from other kinds of values.
Throughout the book I will follow the terminological conventwn that the
word "values," used without qualification, will mean "personal, moral,
social and other values, but not cognitive values." I beg no questions of
substance in doing so; should it be established that cognitive cannot be
distinguished from other kinds of values the convention will have to be
dropped - so too will impartialiry. The role granted to cognitive values of
course penetrates to the very heart of scientific practices. So long as no
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non-cognitive values penetrate in similar ways, there is nothing that the
proponents of "science is value free" need regard as threatening.
Where science and values "touch": a miscellany

To use Poincare's evocative words there are many places where science and
values may touch but not interpenetrate. I will list some of what have been
considered the more important places of "touch," 7 without further
comment, simply for the sake of clarifying what is, and what is not, at stake
(for its proponents) in the idea that science is value free:
•

•

•

Science itself is a value (not necessarily an unsubordinated one). This
affirmation comes in many versions: knowledge (truth) is a value;
science informs practices that produce value; its own practice requires
the exercise of rationality, a universal value (Nage! 1961), or more
generally, it cultivates in its practitioners characteristics that are con
ducive to human flourishing or well-being (Putnam 1981, 1990); it
creates beauty (Poincare 1920/ 1958).
The making of value judgments, and relations among value
judgments, can be informed (and criticized) by scientific knowledge of
means to ends and the attainability of ends.
There can be scientific (psychological, sociological, historical and
perhaps biological) studies of values: Of their being held, manifested
and embodied in persons, institutions and cultures, and of how par
ticular values come to be held and transformed (Lacey and Schwartz
1996).
There can be ethical evaluation of, and restrictions on, scientific
practice and applications. There are, for example, ethical issues that
arise in connection with the choice of research goals, the staffing of
research activities, the selection of research methods (and experimen
tal subjects), the specification of standards of proof, the dissemination
of research findings, the control of scientific information, and the
credit for research accomplishments (Rescher 1965: 274). Deploying a
soundly accepted theory in practical application, its specific manner of
application, and judgments about its "significance" reflect ethical
evaluation. That a theory is sufficiently well supported to warrant its
practical application, in view both of the "side effects" of applications
(Scriven 1974) and of the risks of its application should it turn out to
be false, involves ethical judgments (Rudner 1953).
Values may play numerous roles (either positive or negative) in the
"context of discovery," concerning judgments made in connection
with the various stances that precede acceptance of a theory; in
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sensitizing researchers to the importance of certain facts; in motivating
research efforts (Rescher 1965); and in assessing "scientific perform
ances," such as carrying out experiments or writing papers (Scriven
1974).
Values may play a role in connection with the compromises reached
involving autonomy (discussed in the preceding section), for example
concerning questions raised, research supported and problems se
lected; and in making judgments about whether a certain line of
research should be carried out in view of probable applications that
would follow.
Commitment to certain values may motivate scrutiny of common
scientific practices for "biases," focus on particular problems and
policies regarding membership of the scientific community; there may
be value-based criticism of scientific practices and institutions.
The practices of science may require that their practitioners manifest
certain personal and moral values (the "scientific ethos") and reinforce
the valuing of certain personal traits (for example, creativity, mathe
matical and experimental capabilities). Since it has social and material
conditions, it may progress, or its rate of progress may be affected at a
given time, where particular social and personal values are dominant,
and what these values are may vary with the historical moment (Hull
1988: 76). It may also, for the sake of the fuller manifestation of
impartiality, require that a variety of (social and moral) values be held
among its many practitioners.
The practitioners of science may incur special moral and social
responsibilities in the light of their activities and discoveries.

Science as value free: fact, idealization, or
value?

That science is value free, I repeat, does not mean that there is no interplay
between science and values; only that what interplay there is leaves the
three component views untouched. Thus, matters of values may illuminate
all sorts of aspects of the practice, sociology, institutionalization and
history of science. It is not enough to impugn that science is value free to
display ways in which science and values "touch" each other.
Furthermore it is not enough to impugn "science is value free" that one
or other of the components is actually not highly reflected in some aspects
of scientific practice. Neutrality, for example, may not be highly manifested
in actual fact since available scientific knowledge (given current conditions)
may be significantly applicable only in support of certain values; yet it may
remain open to fuller manifestation in principle.
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Among its proponents, each of the components of "science is value
free" is itself a value, to be expressed in scientific practices and embodied
in scientific institutions, a value embedded in the objectives of science
itsel[ There is nothing paradoxical about this. As values they are
manifested to varying degrees in scientific practices and in the acts of
accepting or rejecting theories. Its proponents suggest that "science is value
free" is also actually reflected - at least as an idealization - in many fields
of science, so that in the modern scientific tradition the value, "science is
value free," has become well manifested; as the slogan goes: "How else can
one explain that we got to the moon?" In some fields of science, for
example, psychology, it is much more difficult to back up the suggestion
that it is actually manifested even as idealization. Nevertheless, as long as it
is deemed possible of fuller manifestation (in a field of inquiry), it can
serve as a guiding value or regulative ideal. It is not impugned unless it is
shown that the trajectory of science is not or ought not be in the direction
of its fuller manifestation in the making of theory choices, that it cannot or
ought not serve as a regulative ideal - perhaps by showing that cognitive
and other kinds of value cannot be distinguished or by arguing that there is
no way to institutionalize scientific practice that can ensure that theories
are chosen only in view of considerations of cognitive value.
I am not putting "science is value free" beyond the scope of critical
appraisal, but pointing to the genuine complexity and multifacetedness of
the interplay of science and values. The interplay is not all at the levels of
logic, method or even metaphysics. How fully "science is value free" is
expressed in scientific practices can depend in part on the social conditions
in which research is conducted. The question, "What conditions of
research are conducive to the fuller expression of 'science is value free'?" is
not trivial. It is a question that needs to be informed by empirical inquiry,
historical as well as sociological and psychological, that may also point to
how, for example factors, other than the data and the cognitive norms,
could have (unobtrusively) played a role in certain theories becoming
accepted in violation of impartiality. (Thus, heuristically, the sociology of
inquiry is relevant to the "context of justification.") I take the components
of "science is value free" to be theses about the actual (past, present and
future) acceptance of theories, not logical theses about an idealized science.
It is idle to affirm that they represent values of scientific practice if the
social conditions for their progressive fuller realization are neither present
nor plausibly available to be implemented.
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PREVIEW
My principal goal is to explicate and to appraise the three ideas (imparti,ality,
neutrality and autonomy) that jointly constitute the view that science is value
free. Thus Chapters 4 and 10 provide the foci around which all the other
themes are gathered. "Science is value free" has two faces. One looks
toward the sciences themselves; it deals with how values do and do not,
ought and ought not, interact with the making of theory choices and with
the drawing of consequences Oogical and practical) from accepted theories,
and the practical and institutional conditions in which they do and can do
so. The other looks toward the place of science with respect to the values
we hold, and how it does and does not, can and cannot, serve the projects
that express these values. Often "science is value free" has been treated as
little more than a footnote to discussions of scientific inference and
methodology. I think it also bears on the deep value issues and conflicts of
our age. Science and values are equally at the center of my attention, and
so I embed my argument in an account of the general character of values
(Chapter 2), and a detailed analysis of the role that scientific practices play
with respect to the predominant values of modernity (Chapter 6) and of
the role they might play with respect to competing values. Concerning the
latter I defend the cognitive credibility of approaches to systematic
empirical inquiry that are more in tune with making a variety of forms of
human flourishing sustainable (Chapters 8 and 9).
My methodology involves two key steps. First, beginning from the ideas
sketched earlier in "Sources," I offer provisional theses (Chapter 4) of
imparti,ality, neutrality and autonomy. They are intended to provide a plausible
reconstruction of the idea of science as value free that resonates
throughout the tradition of modern science. The arguments of Chapters S
to 9 provide the material for a thorough critique of these theses. Then the second step - by way of a series of revisions motivated by these
arguments I formulate (Chapter 10) new versions of imparti,ality and
neutrality (though not autonomy) which I defend.
The provisional theses are already responsive to my account of the
general character of values (Chapter 2), and they are formulated on the
assumption that cognitive values (rather than rule-governed accounts of
any kind) provide a satisfactory account of the character of the cognitive
value of theories (Chapter 3). They are theses about scientific practices
(and their theoretical products) which draw from the fusion of the Galilean
and Baconian ideas introduced on p. 6. In the light of proposing that the
objective of science is to gain understanding of domains of phenomena explanations of them and encapsulations of the possibilities they allow - I
argue (Chapter S) that these ideas can and ought to be separated.
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Then, scientific practices which draw on the fused Galilean/Baconian
ideas appear as the practices of one approa,ch to science, one in principle
among many, one that deploys particular strategies - materialist strategies
(Chapter 4) - (oversimplifying) that constrain the theories that are enter
tained to those that may represent phenomena in terms of being generated
from underlying structure, process and law; and that se/,ect empirical data
that may bear on such theories, especially data that report the outcomes of
measuring and experimental operations in abstraction from the human
and social contexts of the investigation. Following the materialist strategies
we have been remarkably successful in identifying the "material possibili
ties" of phenomena, those possibilities that can be represented in terms of
the generative power of underlying structure, process and law. But they do
not enable us to gain access to those possibilities open to phenomena in
virtue of their relations with human beings or with the social order.
Perhaps (in principle) other approaches would enable us to do so,
approaches (consistent with the Baconian idea) aiming to gain systematic
empirical understanding appraised in the light of the cognitive values.
If (in principle) there are alternative approaches, why are the various
materialist strategies deployed almost exclusively in the practices of
modern science? My answer in Chapter 6, consolidated with a reflection
on Kuhn in Chapter 7, points not to Galilean metaphysics, but to mutually
reinforcing interactions between adopting the materialist strategies and
"the modern values of control," most importantly the value of expanding
our capability to exercise control over natural objects.8
More generally, it is not possible to pursue the objective of science
(gaining understanding) except within the confines of a particular
approach, where each approach is defined by the adoption of particular
strategies which interact in mutually reinforcing ways with particular (social
and moral) values. 9 Are there "really" alternatives to adopting the
materialist strategies? Are there "really" alternative strategies under which
we can gain theories that become accepted in accordance with impartiality?
I offer (Chapters 8 and 9) two anticipatory alternatives: one - developed
among some grassroots movements in third-world countries - character
ized by a dialectical interplay of traditional forms of knowledge (for
example, in agriculture) and materialist investigation interacts with such
values as the enhancement of local well-being, agency and community, and
social and ecological balance; the other, which permits an essential role for
intentional categories in the investigation of human cognitive capacities,
interacts with feminist values. There "really" are alternatives, so that
adoption of a strategy is justified (in part) and explained by its link with
values.
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Values thus pervade the practices in which scientific understanding is
gained; and, actually, the modern values of control are almost all
pervasive. If one rejects these values, if one subordinates the place of
control to other values (for example, to those of grassroots movements or
to feminist ones) it is appropriate to explore alternative strategies. Values
make a difference to what one does in science, to what kinds of possibilities
are grasped in the theories that are produced. Thus, how science is
practiced will have impact on the conditions and possibilities of daily life
and experience. The phrase "science is value free" is thus misleading, and,
in practice, it functions to divert attention away from the fact that strategies
(as well as theories) are chosen, and that the Galilean/Baconian approach
is but one approach among (in principle) many. It is best dropped.
Nevertheless, there is much in its component ideas that should be refined,
retained and emphasized.
The way in which values are pervasive in scientific practice is incom
patible with autonorrry. But impartialiry remains an important, indeed
essential, value of all approaches to gaining scientific understanding.
Although theories are developed under strategies whose adoption is
influenced by values, theories should be accepted only in the light of
considerations that involve empirical data, other accepted theories and the
cognitive values (Chapter 10). The levels of (and grounds for) strategy
adoption and theory acceptance need to be clearly separated, while
maintaining that (in the long run) links with values cannot support a
strategy in the face of its failure to generate theories that are accepted in
accordance with impartialiry. Neutraliry, with its three components:
"consistent with all value judgments," "no (cognitive) consequences in the
realm of values" and "evenhandedly applicable regardless of values held"
turns out to be more complicated, with the second and third components
requiring very significant revisions (Chapter 10). Even then, unlike in the
case of impartialiry, my final version of neutraliry does not articulate a value
that itself would be ranked high in all value outlooks; what should be the
scope of neutraliry remains controversial.
The novelty of my account derives from the identification of a set of
differentiated dialectical relations between scientific practices and values.10
It makes possible a synthesis in which due recognition is paid to the critics
of "science is value free" while retaining, with a measure of re-definition,
core insights of its defenders.

